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Motives for disclosure and non-disclosure: 
a framework and review of the evidence 
Russell Lundholm and Matt Van Winkle* 
Abstract- We develop and utilise a theoretical framework for the purpose of summarising the existing empirical 
work in the voluntary disclosure area. This theoretical framework posits that the primary goal of voluntary disclo- 
sure is reduction of information asymmetry (between managers and investors) and thereby cost of capital. We start 
with a basic or frictionless market where firms choose to disclose all news except worst possible outcomes. The lit- 
erature supporting this basic economic setting is then discussed. The bulk of our review discusses results that de- 
scribe disclosure outcomes when frictions do exist. We organise the empirical findings around three categories of 
frictions: management a) does not know of any information to disclose. b) can not tell information without incur- 
ring a cost. or c) does not care about their firm’s current stock price. 
1. Introduction 
The flow of information coming from investor re- 
lation departments over and above the required 
governmental filings is voluminous. Consider 
IBM. During the four months from June through 
September of 2005, IBM offered seven ‘IR view- 
points’ discussing strategic and operational aspects 
of their business, five ‘Recent Events’ announce- 
ments, including a webcast discussing their second 
quarter results, four podcasts discussing key busi- 
ness and technology topics, and two ‘IR Corner’ 
announcements of specific business developments. 
They also posted the audio recording and 
PowerPoint slides from four executive presenta- 
tions during this period, as well as the extended re- 
sponse to an institutional investor’s question about 
the strategic importance of microelectronics to 
IBM. Beyond the financial data in the required fil- 
ings, these disclosures communicated facts about 
IBM’s market share by product line, its estimates of 
growth in various markets, specifics on new con- 
tracts, the terms of an agreement to sell IBM’s PC 
division, assorted legal settlements, hiring plans, 
plans to acquire software companies, and a refuta- 
tion of the analysis in a negative analyst report. 
These disclosures are in addition to the four full 
time staff working in the IR department who handle 
personal contact with the 23 analysts covering IBM. 
In short, there is a wealth of information flowing 
from the firm to the investor and it goes well be- 
yond the basic regulatory disclosure requirements. 
This paper takes the perspective that the primary 
purpose of voluntary disclosures emanating from a 
firm is to minimise the adverse selection caused by 
investors who, absent such disclosures, are scepti- 
cal about the firm’s future prospects. Clearly, this 
*The authors are at the University of Michigan. E-mail: 
lundholm@bus.umich.edu 
is a simplification - IBM has multiple objectives 
in providing this information - but the evidence 
we summarise in this article fits rather neatly into 
this framework. This is not to say that the actual 
participants in the game - the managers, investor 
relations staff, analysts and investors - see the 
world this way. In fact, the most common articula- 
tion an investor relations person will give for their 
job is ‘selling the stock’, just as if they were sell- 
ing the company’s primary goods or services.’ But 
looking beyond what the agents say to what they 
actually do, the behaviour of the various parties, as 
well as collective market forces, seem to respond 
in a way that is consistent with this economic 
framework. 
What do we mean by ‘disclosure?’ Like every- 
thing in financial accounting, the real issue is not 
if but when. Even for non-financial information, it 
is unreasonable to assume that management can 
bury significant information forever. If IBM is los- 
ing market share in its supply chain management 
business, eventually the market will figure this out, 
either by direct observation or because IBM fails 
to deliver on the estimated financial performance 
for this division. So the question isn’t really ‘dis- 
close’ or ‘not disclose’; rather, it is ‘disclose now’ 
or ‘disclose later’. Some things can be delayed for 
a significant period: other things will be revealed 
in the next quarterly filing. 
Our summary of the empirical evidence is or- 
ganised around the following economic setting. 
Suppose management knows a value-relevant 
piece of information, outside investors know that 
’ I base this claim on over 10 years of experience teaching 
an executive education class for investor relations profession- 
als from Fortune 500 companies. The fact that they are actual- 
ly not selling anything in a secondary market transaction is not 
generally acknowledged. 
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44 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
costs are a good investment or not depends on how 
long the customer hangs around. So imagine that 
there are five firms in a particular market, and each 
has information about their likely customer reten- 
tion rate per year (equivalently, there is one firm 
with five possible retention rates). Suppose their 
information is distributed such that it is equally 
likely that the retention rate is .5, .6, .7, .8, or .9. 
Further, the firm knows this statistic exactly, while 
the outside capital market doesn’t know which 
firm is which, they only know the ex ante distribu- 
tion. Suppose firms can credibly communicate 
their information if they want to, but they don’t 
have to. They don’t have to say anything, but if 
they reveal their retention rate, they can’t lie. 
Imagine some perfect auditing system that will 
back up this disclosure. The key issue here is that 
the market knows that the firm knows its own type 
and knows that the firm can choose to disclose the 
information or not. Finally, suppose that the firm 
would like the market to have the highest possible 
assessment of its customer retention rate, regard- 
less of the true rate, because this will lead to the 
highest market value. 
Now, imagine how this game will play out. The 
firm with the retention rate of .9 could not possibly 
have better information and therefore clearly finds 
it in its best interest to disclose this fact. So assume 
that they do just that. Now look at the game from 
the point of view of the firm with a .8 retention 
rate. They aren’t the best possible type, but if they 
fail to speak then the market will rationally assume 
they must not have a .9 retention rate (because a .9 
firm would reveal itself). The market would ra- 
tionally estimate the retention rate of a firm that 
doesn’t speak to be the average of .5, .6, .7 and .8, 
which equals .65. In light of this, the .8 firm would 
be better off disclosing. So suppose they join with 
the .9 firm and choose to disclose their informa- 
tion. An equivalent argument will apply to the firm 
with a .7 retention rate - not disclosing is met with 
a rational market belief that non-disclosing firms 
must be either .5, .6 or .7, averaging .6, so the .7 
firm is also better off disclosing. 
At this point we should feel special sympathy for 
the firm with the .6 retention rate. If it was not pos- 
sible to disclose customer retention rates then the 
rational market belief would be the ex ante average 
of .7 and the .6 firm would enjoy being overval- 
ued. By simply adding the option to disclose, the 
new equilibrium is such that the .6 firm will be 
forced to disclose as well. Just like the .8 firm and 
the .7 firm before them, the .6 firm has the choice 
to reveal its statistic or be lumped together with 
firms of lower quality. The .6 firm was been 
caught in an equilibrium ‘trap’ and will rationally 
choose to disclose its lowly .6 statistic rather than 
take the average of .5 and .6. Finally, the .5 firm 
can either reveal itself or not but the choice is ir- 
management knows this information, and manage- 
ment can choose to disclose the information or not. 
If they choose to disclose, the disclosure is com- 
pletely credible. In this simple game, absent any 
complications or frictions, there is only one logical 
outcome. Management will fully disclose its infor- 
mation as long as the news isn’t the worst possible 
outcome. Even if the news is ‘bad’, to avoid being 
thought of as having the worst possible news, man- 
agement will disclose everything. This rather stark 
prediction is supported by the belief held by out- 
side investors that a failure to disclose must mean 
that management has the worst possible news. 
Given this response by outside investors, manage- 
ment is rational to disclose everything as long as 
the news isn’t the worst, which in turn makes the 
outside investor response equally rational. 
Why don’t we see full disclosure of all but the 
worst possible news in the real world? The answer 
to this question is the basis of this paper. Full dis- 
closure breaks down when frictions enter the pic- 
ture. We organise the empirical findings around 
three categories of frictions: management (a) does- 
n’t know, (b) can’t tell, or (c) doesn’t care. 
We offer some caveats before launching into the 
details. First, we cannot possibly summarise all the 
empirical literature that is relevant to this large 
area. We refer the reader to the excellent summary 
by Healy and Palepu (2001) as a complement to 
this paper. Second, we will focus mostly on the lit- 
erature describing how different frictions influence 
management’s disclosure decisions. We will give 
much less attention to the subsequent result of the 
disclosure decision on the firm’s cost of capital or 
other market-determined statistics. This is expedi- 
ent, as Christine Botosan is summarising this liter- 
ature in a different paper for this volume. We cannot 
totally ignore the market response to the disclosure 
decision, as these responses are exactly what man- 
agement is trying to influence with its disclosure de- 
cisions. In particular, a recurring theme is that 
increased disclosure benefits the firm by lowering 
the information asymmetry between management 
and outside investors, thus counteracting the ad- 
verse impact of sceptical investors. There may well 
be an even greater cost, so more disclosure need not 
be better; but holding these costs aside for the mo- 
ment, more disclosure should lower the firm’s cost 
of capital. Chronicling how the costs and benefits 
change as frictions are introduced into the basic 
story is the purpose of this paper. 
2. The basic disclosure game 
We will develop the basic disclosure game by way 
of an example. One of the most significant statis- 
tics for a subscription-based firm that is populating 
the internet is the customer retention rate. This sta- 
tistic is the odds that a customer will remain a cus- 
tomer next period. Whether customer acquisition 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
relevant; given that all other firms choose to dis- 
close their retention rates, the .5 firm is complete- 
ly revealed even if it chooses to remain silent. 
We submit that this basic story is a fundamental 
force present in the capital markets. It is supported 
by a rational ‘no news is bad news’ market belief. 
With this as a starting point, a firm can only get 
away without disclosing information when there is 
some friction added to the story that makes this 
market belief irrational. As previously mentioned, 
the frictions can be sorting into three boxes: the 
firm doesn’t know the information in the first 
place, the firm can’t tell for some other reason, or 
the firm doesn’t care, in the sense that it isn’t try- 
ing to maximise the market belief in the first place. 
45 
disclosure ratings are negatively correlated with 
the correlation between earnings and returns. 
Intuitively, this result implies that if the correlation 
between earnings and returns is low, the mandato- 
ry disclosures (financial statements, earnings, etc .) 
are not that informative. Firms in this situation can 
then choose to voluntarily disclose better metrics 
of performance. 
For the purpose of this review, we assume that 
managers’ incentives are sufficiently aligned with 
shareholders that increasing the stock price is a 
reasonable motive to ascribe to them. Given the 
prevalence of stock-based compensation plans 
(e.g. Hall and Liebman (1998) report that by the 
mid-1990s nearly 90% of Fortune 500 firms used 
stock-options in executive compensation plans), 
our assumption is reasonable in most instances. 
3.2. Evidence supporting the basic model before 
complications 
While this review focuses on the recent literature, 
a few earlier results are worth mentioning to estab- 
lish that the basic adverse selection force described 
above is actually at play in the real world. Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) establish the result that disclo- 
sure ratings are increasing in firm performance and 
are greater around public offerings. The results 
support the intuition that managers choose to dis- 
close more when the information is good and when 
they care more about the current stock price. Lang 
and Lundholm (1996) provide evidence that the 
disclosure achieves desirable effects. These bene- 
fits include increased analyst following, more ac- 
curate earnings forecasts, less dispersion and lower 
volatility in forecast revisions. These types of ef- 
fects have been shown to reduce firms’ cost of cap- 
ital in theoretical research. 
Another important disclosure concept is that the 
‘to disclose or not disclose’ decision is, in fact, 
meaningless. The question is better framed as ‘dis- 
close now and have the truth revealed later’. 
Lundholm and Myers (2002) address this principle 
by showing that firms with more informative disclo- 
sure (as measured by analysts’ disclosure ratings) 
have current stock returns which are more highly 
correlated with future earnings. They argue that 
more disclosure results in more of forward-looking 
information being reflected in the current stock 
price. Essentially, f m s  cannot cheat fate; if they 
don’t disclose the information the underlying eco- 
nomic events will still manifest themselves in the ac- 
counting income and, ultimately, in the cash flows. 
3. Are the basic forces at work? 
Before we examine more complicated forces, such 
as the need to hide information from competitors, 
let’s consider whether the basic forces of the ad- 
verse selection game are present. Does manage- 
ment actually want to increase the stock price by 
reducing adverse selection? Does voluntary dis- 
closure actually provide credible information to 
the market? Does the market respond sceptically in 
the face of no disclosure, and absent other observ- 
able reasons why a firm might choose to not dis- 
close? Does the most simple prediction - that 
firms are more inclined to disclose private infor- 
mation when their information is good - actually 
hold in large samples when countervailing forces 
are not present? 
3.1. Is the disclosed information useful? 
This seems like a ridiculous question in the ab- 
stract - why would anyone care about disclosure 
decisions if the fodder of press releases and 
webcasts was not useful information? The count- 
er-argument is that all investor relations depart- 
ment do is provide fluff and useless spin on the 
mandatory accounting disclosures. Prior to the de- 
velopment of the voluntary disclosure literature, 
this would have been the most likely response 
from an accounting academic trained under the 
tyranny of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
Consider the most direct evidence on this point. 
Bowen et al. (2002) finds that conference calls are 
informative in the sense that conference call use is 
correlated with more accurate analyst forecasts. 
More compelling, is the evidence provided by 
Bowen et al. that shows the most inaccurate ana- 
lysts show the greatest improvement after the in- 
troduction of conference calls. In a related article, 
Kimbrough (2005) finds that conference call initi- 
ation significantly reduces serial correlation in an- 
alyst errors and post earnings announcement drift. 
Another result suggesting voluntary disclosure 
provides useful information comes from Lang and 
Lundholm (1993), where the authors show that 
4. Managers care about increasing stock 
price using disclosures 
Miller (2002) studies a sample of firms who start 
off with unambiguously good news; in particular, 
they have enjoyed an extended period of seasonal- 
ly adjusted earnings increases. The study finds that 
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46 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
0 
Figure 1 
Disclosures by 36 firms with eight consecutive earnings increases followed by an earnings decrease 
(source: Miller, 2002) 
- -_  --_ 
I I I 
---_ __------ _ 
260 13  
1 2 3 4 
Year 
Disclosure 
- - -Forecasts 
the disclosure quantity increases steadily as the 
news continues to be good, and the market re- 
sponds positively. The market reaction is positive 
in the sense that returns average 1.2% over the 
three days surrounding bundled disclosures (i .e. 
two or more disclosures at the same time). In this 
study disclosures include financial forecasts, earn- 
ings announcements (including supplementary ex- 
planations), operations decisions and personnel 
announcements. This result establishes that the 
disclosures appear to possess information content 
and that they are generally good news disclosures. 
However, as the firm sees that the string of earn- 
ings increases is about to end, the disclosures get 
remarkably short-sighted. The common explana- 
tion for this is that ‘the future is too hard to see’, 
which, as discussed below, is a great way to try to 
beat the ‘no news is bad news rational response’. 
And when the news turns out bad, the level of dis- 
closure also decreases. 
Figure 1 shows that disclosures peak in year 2 
(the year during which the sample firms experi- 
ence the greatest performance). For example, in 
year 2 the 36 firms provided a total of 70 financial 
forecasts. In year 4 (when the performance decline 
was well underway) only 18 such forecasts were 
provided. A similar result is shown globally in 
Healy et al. (2004), who find a significant relation 
between performance and disclosure for a sample 
of nearly 800 firms from 24 countries in the 
Pacific Rim and Europe. 
Other research establishes a key element of the 
disclosure game: the credibility of voluntary dis- 
closures. Firms cannot simply announce to the 
world that they are great; they must provide credi- 
ble information supporting such claims. Hutton et 
al. (2003) show that good news disclosures are 
often accompanied by verifiable forward-looking 
statements and good news without the forward- 
looking information gamer smaller market reac- 
tions. In contrast, the authors find that bad news 
announcements require no explanation for the 
market to respond. 
To this point we have described a theoretical 
model that describes how some firms make disclo- 
sure choices and how other players (analysts, in- 
vestors, etc) respond to these choices. We also 
briefly summarised some key empirical findings 
consistent the idea that the basic forces described 
in the model are at work in the capital market. The 
next step is to describe why the ‘full disclosure’ 
prediction isn’t observed in the real world. In other 
words, what frictions exist that will cause the basic 
game to break down and, correspondingly, cause 
some firms to disclosure more than others? 
As discussed above, there are three main sources 
of friction that can cause the full disclosure pre- 
diction to fail. All work by creating an alternative 
explanation for why a firm didn’t disclose other 
than the ‘assume the worst’ belief that supports the 
full disclosure prediction. The first friction is if the 
managers choosing disclosures simply do not care 
to play the game - they are not motivated to in- 
crease the stock price. This is possible if the man- 
agers do not have the same incentives as do a 
firm’s shareholders. If managers do not care about 
their firm’s stock price then (within the context of 
the simple model) they have no motivation to dis- 
close any information. The second friction is that 
managers may have competing motivations. If 
there are ways in which firm value is affected by 
disclosure, other than investors evaluating disclo- 
sures for investment decisions, then firms may not 
disclose good news. A common example is disclo- 
sure can help competitors learn about a firm and 
react to the detriment of that firm. Third, lack of 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 47 
disclosure can result if managers’ simply don’t 
know anything with reasonable certainty about 
their firm. The following sections summarise re- 
cent findings supporting the existence of the three 
frictions. 
5. Don’t care 
The full disclosure prediction from the basic model 
falls apart if managers aren’t trying to maximise the 
current stock price. While it is difficult to imagine 
managers not caring about stock prices at all, it is 
likely that the level of concern for the current price 
varies across managers and time periods. Settings 
where there are large variations in managerial stock 
ownership are natural places to look for this affect. 
The important empirical result is first established in 
the literature by Nagar et al. (2003). The authors 
show that disclosure, measured as analyst ratings or 
frequency of management earnings forecasts, in- 
creases when the CEO compensation is more heav- 
ily weighted toward the stock price and when the 
CEO owns more of the firm. 
Guo et al. (2004) finds that firms with managers 
who retain the majority of their shares after the 
firm’s IPO do not disclose as much as managers 
who sell a significant portion of their shares. 
Intuitively, this result shows that managers who 
stand to personally profit the most during an IPO 
provide the most disclosure to the market. This is 
not to say that managers not selling shares do not 
care at all about stock price; it is simply that they 
do not care as much as managers making direct 
personal profit. In related work, Rogers (2005) 
shows that managers tend to disclose more when 
they are buying firm shares on their own account 
and disclose less when they are selling shares. 
Rogers uses liquidity as a proxy for disclosure, lim- 
iting the conclusions drawn from the work as there 
are numerous other factors affecting liquidity. 
Some current work focuses on peripheral corpo- 
rate mechanisms that in theory have been shown to 
further align shareholder and managerial incen- 
tives. Ajinkya et al. (2005) provides evidence that 
managers choose to supply greater disclosure when 
outside directors hold board seats and when institu- 
tional investors hold large amounts of their firms’ 
stock. Outside directors and institutional investors 
are conjectured to be shareholder advocates and 
theoretical research has shown they can exert more 
influence than individual shareholders by overcom- 
ing organisational costs. If directors and institu- 
tions have influence on managerial decisions and 
represent shareholders then their presence increas- 
es incentive alignment. Related work by 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) finds that disclosure 
increases under the influence of effective boards 
and audit committees. These two papers used man- 
agerial forecasting as the primary disclosure proxy. 
While this strand of literature is new and not yet 
fully developed, the evidence is consistent with the 
model’s notion that the full disclosure equilibrium 
is influenced by the degree to which firm manage- 
ment has the same incentives as do the owners of 
the firm. 
6. Can’t tell 
The basic game described above assumes that the 
direct costs of disclosure are zero and the only party 
to the disclosure is the capital market. However, 
what if it costs money to create and disseminate a 
credible disclosure? And what if other parties are 
also privy to the disclosure and they sometimes use 
the information to the detriment of the firm? A rich 
area of recent development in the accounting litera- 
ture describes situations where there are costs to dis- 
closure that impinge upon the firm. 
Several papers have examined the relation be- 
tween competitive pressure and disclosure. 
Intuition suggests that when a firm has particular- 
ly good private information it may not want its 
competitors to know about it for fear that they will 
enter the market or in some other way impose 
costs on the firm. This friction, if anything, has be- 
come stronger in recent years with increased dis- 
closure regulation and more rapid information 
dissemination. Regulation FD has removed the 
previously viable option of disclosing good new to 
analysts only and thereby affecting stock prices 
without revealing the information to competitors. 
In today’s environment any news a firm wishes to 
disclose to the market will also be communicated 
to competitors. In this vein, Botosan and Stanford- 
Harris (2005) examine segment reporting disclo- 
sures. They use retroactive segment reporting 
disclosures required by the FASB’s Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard # I  3 1 to show that 
firms that had previously chosen to hide segment 
information were often firms making high profits 
in low competition segments. Further evidence is 
provided by Guo et a1 (2004) who find, for a sam- 
ple of biotech lPOs, that firms are more forthcom- 
ing if they are further along in the product 
development cycle or have patent protection for 
their products. 
Political and competitive costs are examined in 
conjunction by Bhojraj et al. (2004). During the 
electric utility deregulation of 1996-1997, firms 
that were uncertain about the amounts of recover- 
able costs the government would allow tended to 
disclose less positive information. After firms 
locked in their rates, good news disclosures in- 
creased but were muted in cases where strong 
product competition forces were present. 
Johnson et al. (2001) examine legal costs as an 
impediment to disclosure. The authors find more 
forward looking disclosure among high-technolo- 
gy firms after the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995. The act specifically provided 
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48 
for protection against class action suits based on 
failures to meet financial projections and forward 
looking statements. The authors find that the in- 
crease in disclosure was greatest for the firms that 
were previously at the most risk for litigation. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
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7. Don’t know 
The last friction we discuss is that firms simply 
have nothing to disclose. Of course managers of 
firms must know something, but it is possible they 
do not know anything more than what is required 
in mandatory disclosures. Additionally, there may 
be many situations where managers know some- 
thing with such great uncertainty that legal worries 
(see above) or application of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles prevent them from provid- 
ing the disclosures. The ‘don’t know’ friction has 
been largely untested in the accounting literature. 
This is a result of the obvious difficulty of meas- 
uring what a manager does not know. In particular, 
it is much easier to credibly commit to knowing 
something than it is to credibly commit to not 
knowing something. 
One result does suggest that managers are al- 
ready disclosing everything that they do know. 
Heflin et al. (2003) find that there is no improve- 
ment in analyst forecast accuracy or reduction in 
forecast dispersion after Regulation FD2 (Fair 
Disclosure), despite the increase in forward look- 
ing statements that occurred after the law. This is 
indirect evidence that perhaps not much else is 
known by managers with sufficient certainty to be 
useful information for the market. Nonetheless, 
the ‘don’t know’ defence is the primary tool of in- 
vestor relations departments when being harassed 
by analysts for more information. 
8. Conclusion 
There are countless reasons firms give for not dis- 
closing information that the capital market could 
use to more accurately value the firm. Most reasons 
sort into one of the three boxes we describe in this 
paper. The empirical evidence shows that firms and 
the capital market seem to respond to their envi- 
ronment in a way that is broadly consistent with the 
basic full disclosure model and attendant frictions 
that alter the model’s full disclosure prediction. 
’ Regulation Fair Disclosure was a rule prohibiting firms 
from privately disclosing value-relevant information to select- 
ed market participants without simultaneous public disclosure. 
This ruling was primarily targeted at the practice of giving in- 
formation to preferred analysts. The law went was implement- 
ed on 23 October 2000. 
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